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ABSTRACT: This paper argues that the Fairtrade certification system 
represents an illuminating example of the challenge of systematically 
determining consumer and entrepreneurial responsibilities in our 
global age. In taking up the central question of what, if anything, 
may be called ‘just’ or ‘fair’ in Fairtrade, I more precisely argue 
for a two-fold thesis: that (1) a meaningful evaluation of Fairtrade 
must consider both an interactional and an (arguably prior) 
institutional understanding of global responsibilities to promote 
justice and that (2) Fairtrade can be better defended against several 
popular objections from the perspective of a theory that adequately 
differentiates between interactional responsibilities and institutional 
responsibilities of promoting justice under unjust circumstances.
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Introduction
The Fairtrade1 certification system, organised and overseen by national labelling 
organisations and the international umbrella organisation Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisations International (FLO), is one of the most well-known initiatives 
endeavouring to fulfil the responsibilities of consumers and entrepreneurs 
towards producers in developing countries. In addition to providing incentives 
for ecological production methods, the Fairtrade system aims primarily at 
establishing and securing minimal social labour standards in the production 
processes within developing countries. Its main instruments consist of 
effectively guaranteed minimum prices and minimum wages, long-term trading 
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conference ‘The Diversity of Human Rights’ at the Inter-University 
Centre Dubrovnik in 2008, at the InIIS/BIGSSS research colloquium at the University of Bremen, the Artec Research 
Centre for Sustainability at the University of Bremen, the Political Theory Colloquium at the Goethe-University of 
Frankfurt, and at the GAP7 conference in Bremen (all in 2009). I wish to thank the participants at these events for 
stimulating discussions. I’m also grateful to Markus Fiebig, Stefan Gosepath, Christoph Humrich, Jekaterina Markov, 
Peter Mayer, Miriam Ronzoni and Laura Valentini, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their insightful criticisms 
and very helpful suggestions. A German version of this paper has also been published: ‘Interaktionale und institutionelle 
Relationen der Verantwortung. Überlegungen zu Fairtrade aus gerechtigkeitstheoretischer Perspektive’, InIIS-Working 
Paper Nr. 36 (Bremen: Institut für Interkulturelle und Internationale Studien, 2009).
1. To distinguish the certification system organised through FLO from the wider movement for justice in international 
trade, I will use the one-word expression ‘Fairtrade’ to refer to the former, while the two-word expression ‘Fair Trade’ will 
refer strictly to the latter. 
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partnerships, the requirement of adequate workplace conditions and support for 
local and regional health, education and infrastructure projects. 
The successes of Fairtrade in terms of considerably improved working and living 
conditions for certified producers in developing countries are both empirically 
demonstrated as well as reflected in a growing public appreciation – as evidenced 
by the exponentially increasing sales of products displaying the FLO label.2 Yet 
critical voices have questioned the aim of expanding the Fairtrade system beyond 
its present form within a still small niche market. Significantly, among the various 
criticisms are those that are explicitly normative in substance and which hold 
that the application and extension of the Fairtrade system to a broad spectrum of 
globally traded goods is not desirable. In this paper, I want to examine the tenability 
of such criticism through the perspective of normative political theory. The key 
question I shall address is what, if anything, can be called ‘just’ or ‘fair’ in Fairtrade, 
that is, on which conception of justice, and corresponding responsibilities, can its 
supporters rely. The core methodological premise of this approach is that a justice-
oriented theoretical reflection of Fairtrade will be illuminating not only for the 
evaluation of Fairtrade as a practical approach to improve the conditions of poor 
producers in the developing world, but also for the theoretical task of developing a 
theory of justice which is sensitive to existing practices. 
In the course of the paper, I will first outline the main empirical characteristics 
of the FLO system and then discuss some criticisms of it. In the following 
section, an elaboration of the distinction between interactional and institutional 
responsibilities to promote justice in the global context will provide the 
theoretical background against which the Fairtrade system is to be judged. In 
the final section, it will be shown how this distinction can be brought to bear 
on the evaluation of the Fairtrade system and how the normative criticisms of 
the idea of social certification in world trade can thereby be better situated. The 
main conclusion developed here will be that Fairtrade can indeed – despite some 
room for criticism – be normatively justified, and that theoretical reflection on its 
normative standing helps us better understand the challenges faced in establishing 
responsibilities for global justice under unjust background conditions.
The Empirical Background and Core Elements of the FLO System
Historically, the primary goal of Fairtrade was to support small-scale 
agrarian producers in developing countries – those who normally belong to 
the poorest sectors of these societies – through the establishment of long-term 
trading partnerships. Today, FLO certifies not only products such as coffee and 
2. See in particular A. Nicholls and C. Opal, Fair Trade, Market-Driven Ethical Consumption (London: SAGE Publications, 
2004); D. Jaffee, Brewing Justice, Fair Trade Coffee, Sustainability, And Survival (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2007).
3GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (3) 2010
THEORIZING FAIRTRADE FROM A JUSTICE-RELATED STANDPOINT
cocoa beans, which are still grown by small-scale farmers who own their land 
cooperatively, but also products like bananas or tea which are typically grown in 
larger plantations that can also apply for certification if they comply with FLO 
standards.3 
The first important element of Fairtrade certification is the principle of creating 
transparent and long-term trade relationships between producers in developing 
countries and the importers, processors and distributors of their products. This 
principle is realized through contracts that bind the distribution partners for a 
certain period of time and that thereby contribute to their planning reliability.4
The second pillar of the FLO system is the aim of direct trade with producers 
by bypassing the unneeded intermediaries who usually play a substantial role 
in global supply chains. Due to the lack of a functioning infrastructure and of 
suitable means of transportation for their goods, small-scale farmers in remote 
rural areas do not enjoy direct access to export markets. Moreover, they often have 
neither reliable information about market prices nor access to competitive credit 
markets. This can be taken advantage of by intermediaries who come to their rural 
areas, buy their products for a price well under the market rate and/or grant them 
loans with relatively bad conditions.5 By joining Fairtrade cooperatives, small-
scale farmers are better able to deal with the disadvantages arising from their 
market remoteness. The cooperative structure (which in the case of small-scale 
farmers is a necessary condition for certification), interim payments through the 
importers as designated by FLO, and continuous consultancy through certifiers all 
contribute towards independence and planning security. These tools are designed 
so that rural producers can achieve the means of transport and communication 
necessary for a more direct trade of their products with importers beyond 
traditional relationships of dependence.
A prominent third element of the Fairtrade system, highly controversial among 
free trade advocates, is the payment of minimum prices to producers. These 
are fixed for an average period of two years and normally lie well above market 
prices. The minimum price remains valid as long as the world market price for the 
respective product, typically subject to considerable fluctuation, remains beneath 
it. Once the market price rises above the settled minimum price, the latter becomes 
irrelevant, as purchasers are now required to pay the higher market price. But even 
in this case a second financial instrument, the so-called social premium, comes 
3. For a comprehensive empirical account of the Fairtrade system, see Nicholls and Opal (2004); for views on the history of 
the Fair Trade movement and the Fairtrade certification system, see Jaffee (2007), pp. 12-17, and L. Raynolds, D. Murray 
and J. Wilkinson (eds), Fair Trade: The challenges of transforming globalization (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 15-32. 
4. TRANSFAIR, Jahresbericht 2007 – Ausblick 2008 (Köln: TRANSFAIR/Rugmark, 2008), p. 7. 
5. Nicholls and Opal (2005), pp. 33 et seq.
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into play. This second payment is transferred to a special bank account held by 
the producers and is intended to be used for such local development projects as 
the building of schools, hospitals and bridges.6 Both in cooperatives and in larger 
plantations workers decide independently and with equal voting rights on how 
the social premium is to be used. In plantations this is made possible through 
the election of workers’ representatives, which plantation owners are obliged to 
allow and to respect if they don’t want to lose FLO certification. Since plantation 
workers (as opposed to cooperatives) are not commonly owners of the means 
of production, FLO additionally demands the fulfilment of a more precise set 
of labour standards. Among these are the payment of region-specific minimum 
wages, which are often not effectively established outside the FLO system even 
when they are required by national laws, and the core labour standards of the 
International Labour Organization.7
FLO-CERT, an agency appointed by the FLO but regarded as principally 
independent, controls compliance with the above mentioned core elements of the 
FLO system throughout all parts of the supply chain. It can punish violations of 
the FLO criteria with sanctions ranging up to the decertification of the respective 
producer organization.8 In summary, the Fairtrade system can be regarded as an 
essentially market-based approach to fighting global poverty which through the 
use of moderate measures aims to correct those forms of global market failures 
that often have catastrophic results on the weakest members of the supply chain.
Criticisms of the FLO System
Independent empirical surveys have repeatedly shown that the above-
mentioned aims of Fairtrade tend to be fulfilled. By and large, they attest to the 
positive effect Fairtrade has on fulfilling the basic needs of certified producers 
in the developing world.9 FLO states that about 1.5 million producers and over 
7.5 million persons in their households profit directly from Fairtrade, with this 
number set to continue to rise.10 But despite these positive findings, the Fairtrade 
system has had to face a number of objections. These objections can be divided 
into two groups: those that refer primarily to empirically possible or reported 
deficiencies in the implementation of the FLO system and those that contest the 
idea of social certification in global trade in general. 
6. TRANSFAIR (2008), p. 12. 
7. Among these are the rights to freedom of association, the prohibition of all forms of forced labour, the elimination of the 
worst forms of child labour and the principle of non-discrimination in employment. 
8. TRANSFAIR (2008), p. 6.
9. See L. Ronchi, The Impact of Fair Trade on Producers and their Organisations. A Case Study with Coocafé in Costa 
Rica, PRUS Working Paper No. 11 (University of Sussex, 2002); P. Taylor, Poverty Alleviation Through Participation in 
Fair Trade Coffee Networks: Synthesis of Case Study Research Question Findings (Colorado State University, 2002); D. 
Murray, L. Raynolds and P. Taylor (eds), One Cup at a Time: Poverty Alleviation and Fair Trade Coffee in Latin America 
(Fair Trade Research Group: Colorado State University, 2003); Nicholls and Opal (2005); and Jaffee (2007).
10. Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, Annual Report 2007 (Bonn: FLO, 2008), p. 3.
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Criticisms of Implementation Failures within the FLO System
Doubts belonging to the first group of objections are frequently raised by 
advocates of the Fair Trade movement and centre on the phenomenon known as 
the ‘mainstreaming of Fairtrade’. Products with the FLO label are now an integral 
part of the product line-up of profit-oriented supermarket-chains, whereas 
before its launch in the late 80’s and early 90’s, products associated with the Fair 
Trade movement could only be found in charity-based outlets. The underlying 
worry concerning this development is that the adoption of profit-oriented selling-
practices might lead to conditions similar to those the Fair Trade movement 
originally sought to oppose.11 Another point of criticism, mostly coming from 
the opposite side of the political spectrum, finds fault in the supposedly lacking 
efficiency of Fairtrade and emphasizes the fact that very little of the price paid for 
FLO products actually reaches producers.12
 Despite their clearly divergent motives, the similarity of these objections lies in 
their reference to those flaws in the Fairtrade system which seem to be avoidable 
within the context of worldwide social certification. With respect to the first 
concern, some observers point to the need for, and the possibility of, refining the 
FLO certification system so that large supermarket chains selling products with 
the FLO label under their own brands are better integrated into the certification 
process and are not able to exercise pressure that would be counter-productive 
to the movement’s principles.13 With respect to the second criticism, it should be 
noted that the division of the price for the final product into the different parts 
of the supply chain does not point to inefficiency in and of itself, but is instead 
a direct consequence of the nature of global supply chains. Despite the core aim 
of direct trade, Fairtrade supply chains still consist of more than two parts, 
including the Fairtrade producers, certifiers, processors (as in the case of coffee 
and cocoa), importers, distributors, packagers and retailers in the developed 
world. A real and problematic inefficiency seems to exist only in those cases when 
considerable parts of the retail price are branched off by supply chain members 
in search of higher profits without any inherent necessity or without benefit to 
Fairtrade producers. 
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11. See Raynolds, Murray and Wilkinson (2007), pp. 103-122.
12. See for example M. Sidwell, Unfair Trade (London: Adam Smith Institute, 2008), available at <http://www.
adamsmith.org/publications/economy/unfair-trade-20080225961> 
13. It was argued that the National Fairtrade Initiative of the UK, unlike the National Initiatives of some other countries, 
allows supermarkets to outsource compliance with the FLO-principles to companies processing, manufacturing and/
or packaging Fairtrade products, even though it is still the supermarket brand which appears next to the FLO label on 
the product. As this allows big supermarket chains to utilize pressure mechanisms which should be avoided within the 
FLO certification-system (like a sudden switch of suppliers in the search for the cheapest price), it could be argued that 
it is crucial that large supermarket chains remain an integral part of the certification system. See  Raynolds, Murray and 
Wilkinson (2007), pp. 103-122.
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This kind of behaviour has already been observed in some parts of the supply 
chain of certain Fairtrade products, as in the case of coffee chains inappropriately 
charging higher amounts for cups of coffee brewed with Fairtrade coffee beans 
and thereby directly (and illegitimately) profiting from a misleading suggestion 
of responsible corporate behaviour on their part.14 But there could be ways of 
displaying and/or preventing such ‘hidden’ surcharges within the FLO system, and 
it may be assumed that a higher market presence of Fairtrade certified products 
could, at the very least, help keep unnecessary surcharges within reasonable 
limits due to increased competition between the various distributors of these 
products.15 Despite legitimate doubts about some implementation failures in 
the supply chain of socially certified products, it is thus to be concluded that the 
growth of Fairtrade in general and the distribution of FLO certified products 
through corporations in particular do not seem to contradict the ideal of Fairtrade 
in themselves, as long as companies respect the above mentioned core elements 
and principles. 
Normatively Relevant Objections to the FLO System
Turning towards criticisms of the second group, it is important to point out 
that they articulate principled concerns about a global certification system 
like Fairtrade as such. These criticisms share the presupposition that the 
voluntary assumption of responsibility on the part of companies and consumers, 
which of course underlies the whole concept of Fairtrade, is inadequate. This 
presupposition is present in at least three lines of argument.
First, a rather simple and still only descriptive specification of this line of 
criticism is the thesis that socially responsible behaviour by consumers and 
businesspeople as market-actors is illusionary and unrealistic. Fairtrade’s 
market-success, however, serves as adequate evidence that today’s consumers can 
and do increasingly demand compliance with minimum ethical standards in the 
production process. Moreover, the establishment of a certification system such 
as Fairtrade can and should be regarded as an attempt to give consumers clearer 
indications for purchase decisions that are at least partly morally motivated.
A second and intrinsically normative objection to Fairtrade would admit that, 
while consumers and entrepreneurs can act on reasons other than self-interest, it 
would be morally wrong to do so. In the case of companies, it has been famously 
argued that they should not (morally) do this, since their moral responsibility 
exhausts itself in the maximization of profits.16 Viewed from this perspective, 
14. See T. Harford, The Undercover Economist (London: Abacus, 2006), pp. 33 et seq., and Nicholls and Opal (2005), 
pp. 51-52.
15. See Nicholls and Opal (2005), pp. 51 et seq.
16. See as a locus classicus, M. Friedman, ‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’ in G. Chryssides 
and J. Kaler (eds.), An Introduction to Business Ethics (London: Chapman & Hall, 1993), pp. 249-254.
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self-interested entrepreneurial behaviour in the sense of the maximization of 
profits can indeed conform to a compliance with social minimum standards in 
the production process as long as this compliance is only a reaction to growing 
concern among consumers and not an intrinsic moral motive on the part of 
entrepreneurs. Admittedly, the pure form of market liberalism expressed in 
this stance might well be regarded as being far too radical, especially given that 
today many entrepreneurs employ concepts like ‘corporate social responsibility’, 
‘social entrepreneurship’ and ‘corporate citizenship’ (which all refer to some 
sort of compliance with social standards) and hold them to be to some degree 
self-evidentially justifiable. It is, however, no overstatement that such a view, to 
which I will later refer as the ‘actor-centred criticism of Fairtrade’, was for a long 
time highly influential among economists and seems to have retained influence 
well beyond this sphere.
A third normative objection may at first sight carry more appeal than the two 
preceding criticisms. It states that, although consumers and entrepreneurs can be 
said to carry a degree of responsibility for the fulfilment of social standards in the 
production process, this should not be redeemed via the voluntary participation in 
such certification systems but via the implementation of those standards through 
the agreement on and enforcement of corresponding laws. Several reasons can 
be given in support of this position. It could be said, for instance, that such a 
juridification of social standards would be a much more efficient way of realizing 
the elementary aims of the FLO system, since it would replace the certification 
system with an effective system of law and law enforcement measures, in which 
all entrepreneurs would be forced to comply globally with social standards thanks 
to the threat of legal sanctions in the event of non-compliance. Therefore, even 
if distributors or vendors of Fairtrade products voluntarily abstained from the 
types of disproportionate surcharge mentioned previously, a scenario of law 
enforcement would still seem to be the superior option, as the additional costs 
of administrative certification measures (necessary in any private system of 
social certification and finally passed on to consumers) would no longer apply. 
Weightier doubts, which can also be taken as pointing to the necessity of the legal 
implementation of social standards, focus on the minimum prices paid within 
the FLO system and consider the risk of counter-productive effects in the event 
of a quantitative expansion in FLO certification. Such an expansion would induce 
the wrong market incentives – especially in the agrarian sector, where low world 
market prices mainly stem from a chronic overproduction of certain goods – since 
it would have a similar effect as the subsidization of goods which are already being 
produced in too great a quantity. In this context, critics like Malgorzata Kurjanksa 
and Mathias Risse have even gone so far as to highlight the structural similarities 
THEORIZING FAIRTRADE FROM A JUSTICE-RELATED STANDPOINT
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of Fairtrade certification with the heavily contested agricultural subsidies paid to 
agrarian producers in the USA, Japan and the EU, because both are deemed to be 
‘economically “inefficient”, upholding production beyond what the market would 
sustain’.17
A first response to this third type of objection must be that Fairtrade cannot yet 
be seen as a major factor in distorting market prices because market shares in the 
respective product categories have so far not exceeded one percent;18 compared 
with the agricultural subsidies of developed nations, which have for years 
totalled about $300 billion and are therefore much higher than all development 
assistance combined.19 But if Fairtrade continues to rise and if certified products 
make up much larger market shares, such a danger is at least conceivable.20 This 
line of reasoning could lead one to the conclusion that, in the long run, there 
is no promising alternative to the implementation of social minimum standards 
on a state (and maybe inter-state) level.21 Since the comprehensive institutional 
implementation of minimum social standards in developing countries has so far 
been not more than a distant dream, the scope of this third type of normatively 
relevant objection to Fairtrade, to which I will later refer as the ‘institutions-
centred criticism of Fairtrade’, must be regarded as restricted. But, in order 
to develop a systematic approach justifying responsibilities of consumers and 
entrepreneurs vis-à-vis producers in developing countries both under the present 
as well as under future circumstances, this criticism can hardly be dismissed as 
irrelevant. 
When comparing the two main strands of objection to Fairtrade considered 
in this section – criticisms of implementation failures within the FLO system 
and the more normatively relevant objections to Fairtrade – it can be concluded 
that the second strand, and in particular the institutions-centred criticism, pose 
the more serious threat. This line of critique is independent of any recognizable 
minor deficiencies in the implementation of social certification systems that 
could be remedied through specific adjustments. To get a clearer picture of the 
relevance of the criticisms considered so far, in the following section I will lay 
out and discuss some core issues of the debate over justice- and human rights-
related responsibilities so that we can then apply them to the case of Fairtrade 
and determine the responsibilities of the different actors involved.
17. See M. Kurjanska and M. Risse, ‘Fairness in trade II: export subsidies and the Fair Trade movement’, Politics Philosophy 
& Economics, 7/34 (2008), 29-56, p. 30.
18. See Nicholls and Opal (2005), p. 42. 
19. Compare J. Stiglitz and A. Charlton, Fair Trade For All: How Trade Can Promote Development (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).
20. See Nicholls and Opal (2005), p. 54.
21. For this line of thought, see Harford (2006), p. 231.
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Interactional and Institutional Conceptions of Global Responsibilities
In this section I will make use of a central conceptual distinction in political 
theory which will help us to identify different types of responsibilities in the 
context of Fairtrade. This is the distinction between interactional and institutional 
understandings of human rights and justice, and between the corresponding 
forms of responsibilities generated by these two different understandings of 
these norms. According to Thomas Pogge, upon whose account I will rely in 
drawing this distinction, some norms – including norms related to human rights 
and justice – can be understood in two very different ways: they can be used to 
judge either interactions or social institutions. In this sense, Pogge distinguishes 
between interactional and institutional understandings of human rights and, 
correspondingly, between interactional and institutional duties to respect human 
rights.22 Before examining the applicability of this differentiation to the case of 
justice more broadly, it will be useful to examine Pogge’s central example, that of 
human rights.
The difference between the two mentioned understandings of human rights 
is initially only a formal one insofar as both are consistent with very different 
substantive conceptions of human rights, that is, counting some rights as 
belonging to the spectrum of human rights and excluding others from it. This 
formal difference can best be clarified by distinguishing the different duties 
corresponding to each of the two understandings of human rights. Against the 
background of an interactional understanding of human rights, each postulated 
right has directly corresponding duties on the part of others (the universal right 
to bodily security, for instance, would ground a universal duty not to hurt others 
through one’s behaviour), whereas against the background of the institutional 
understanding of human rights the corresponding moral demands are primarily 
on social institutions. Pogge writes:
By postulating a human right to X, one is asserting that any society 
or other social system, insofar as this is reasonably possible, ought to 
be so (re)organized that all its members have secure access to X, with 
‘security’ always understood as especially sensitive to persons’ risk of 
being denied X or deprived of X officially: by the government or its 
agents or officials.23 
According to Pogge, the institutional understanding of human rights as claims 
upon social institutions takes precedence over the interactional understanding. 
THEORIZING FAIRTRADE FROM A JUSTICE-RELATED STANDPOINT
22. See T. Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’ in C. Cronin and P. Greiff (eds), Global Justice and 
Transnational Politics (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 151-195, and T. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights 
2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), pp. 51 et seq., 70 et seq. and 176 et seq.
23. Pogge (2008), p. 70.
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This is because it better articulates the semantic core of the often ambiguous 
language of human rights.24 Coming back to one assumption already present 
in the institutions-centred criticism of Fairtrade, we can instantly give another 
reason for the priority of institutions over interpersonal interactions as the prime 
object of human rights judgements: it seems by far more effective to protect 
human rights through jointly built social institutions (including law enforcing 
institutions) than to just hope for compliance with human rights by individual 
actors. In the highly complex societies we live in, social institutions, being able 
to coordinate interpersonal behaviour effectively not least through the threat of 
legally enforced sanctions, seem to be a more appropriate object for compliance 
with human rights than interpersonal behaviour alone.
Of course, the priority of the institutional understanding of human rights in 
no way negates the possibility and perhaps even necessity of having additional 
moral restraints on interpersonal behaviour.25 In fact, it would be implausible 
(if not outright contradictory) of a proponent of an institutional conception 
of human rights that postulated a right not to be tortured to not also morally 
condemn acts of torture by private actors. Generally speaking, an institutional 
conception of human rights can in principle be perfectly compatible with 
several substantively filled interactional conceptions of human rights, as long 
as a strong commitment to the institutional component indicating the need to 
maintain, reform or create social institutions in order to protect human rights 
stays untouched. Furthermore, to affirm an institutional understanding of 
human rights in no way means that human rights are norms constraining only 
the behaviour of government representatives or administration workers. On 
the contrary: any plausible institutional conception of human rights triggers far 
reaching secondary duties on the part of all members of society to contribute 
collectively to the (re)formation of social institutions, so that those human rights 
which are substantively postulated according to any comprehensive institutional 
conception of human rights are well protected in their societies.26 
At this point, it is interesting to see why we can even abstain to a certain degree 
from controversial substantive arguments justifying which particular human 
rights should be considered universally valid. Once the institutional understanding 
of human rights is accepted, it can be argued convincingly that, at the substantive 
level, this already implies the postulation of at least a set of so-called basic rights. 
This is so because, for any rights to be institutionally protected at all, this set 
24. See Pogge (2008), T. Pogge, ‘Menschenrechte als moralische Ansprüche an globale Institutionen’ in S. Gosepath and 
G. Lohmann (eds), Philosophie der Menschenrechte (Frankfurt, Main: Suhrkamp 1998), pp. 378-400, and T. Pogge, ‘On 
the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29/2 (2000), 137-169.
25. See also Pogge (2008), p. 176.
26. Pogge (2008), p. 70.
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of basic rights must be protected institutionally to a certain degree, and must 
contain at least the basic rights to subsistence, security and perhaps to political 
participation, though the latter might be contested as already being too specific.27 
To see how far an institutional conception of human rights which, substantively, 
only relies on a conception of basic rights can take us, we need to look again 
at the secondary duties implied by it. It has been suggested already that all 
members of a society carry a joint responsibility for the design of their social 
institutions, so that the substantively postulated human rights are adequately 
protected in their societies. But do citizens of different national societies also 
carry responsibilities towards each other across state boundaries? For instance, 
do citizens of industrialized nations have an institutional responsibility to 
protect the human rights of members of poorer societies?  Pogge argues that, to 
a certain extent, they do. It is interesting to note that – at least on his account 
– this is only the case because, empirically, we live under a system of global 
economic and political institutions like the WTO, IMF, UN, the World Bank 
and non-governmental international organisations, whereas in a counterfactual 
world of completely self-sufficient societies institutional human rights-related 
responsibilities would not reach beyond these particular political spaces.28 In a 
politically and economically interdependent world like ours, the corresponding 
global institutional responsibilities can then be seen as being directed mainly 
towards the (re)formation of these global institutions, whereas the question of 
whether and to what degree citizens of different societies also bear institutional 
responsibilities towards the (re)formation of the national institutions of societies 
other than their own remains an open one.29 
This is where the notion of justice, on which Fairtrade conceptually 
relies, comes into play. One key insight resulting from the discussion of the 
differentiation between institutional and interactional responsibilities is that 
social institutions can be held to conform to certain norms, and that secondary 
THEORIZING FAIRTRADE FROM A JUSTICE-RELATED STANDPOINT
27. This argument was first brought forward in H. Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
28. See Pogge (2008), p. 177. Contemporary political philosophers have developed a range of other accounts justifying or 
negating the global reach of institutional responsibilities and their precise contents, thereby also relying on other grounds 
than the mere existence of current systems of political and/or economic cooperation. It would be impossible to do justice 
to this debate in this paper, and for reasons of limited space its focus has to stay on the distinction of different forms of 
responsibilities, that is, on the distinction of institutional vs. interactional responsibilities, rather than on their precise 
content. 
29. It should be noted here that the distinction of institutional vs. interactional responsibilities is sometimes coined 
differently in the literature on theories of global justice, for example in S. Caney, ‘Global Poverty and Human Rights’ in T. 
Pogge (ed.), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), pp. 275-302, and in E. Ashford, ‘The Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities’ in ibid., 
pp. 183-218. Both authors take the term ‘institutional duties’ to refer to the fact of shared institutions as the reason 
for the postulation of these duties, rather than referring to the form of duties (the meaning used here). Relying on the 
first criterion, duties to contribute to the (re)formation of the social institutions of other national societies may then be 
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institutional responsibilities can be distributed to members of those societies 
which are structured by these institutions. It might now be asked what justifies 
taking a conception of basic rights as the baseline for a moral judgement of social 
institutions. Why shouldn’t we apply an even more demanding set of normative 
principles to national and/or global social institutions, one that would also take 
into account the different possible societal distributions of goods and judge them 
according to egalitarian principles, such as the Rawlsian difference principle? 
Clearly, any normative judgement of social institutions may, in the final analysis, 
rest on a conception of justice in the form of normative principles relying not 
only on absolute but on relative normative standards comparing different societal 
distributions of goods. Furthermore, in light of the contested status of egalitarian 
principles in their application to global institutions, the consensual strategy to 
rely only on a minimal conception of justice seems helpful in the global context, 
and it is frequently argued that a human rights standard can and should function 
as such a minimal conception of justice.30 
The general idea behind this strategy is that reaching international consensus 
on the view that the fulfilment and protection of human rights through national 
and global institutions is a necessary condition for the justice of these institutions 
is more promising than striving for agreement on already sufficient (but possibly 
morally more demanding) conditions for the justice of these institutions. Global 
institutions can therefore be judged as being unjust if they do not conform to this 
normative standard, without indicating concrete criteria, the fulfilment of which 
would make these institutions just in a comprehensive sense.
Evaluating Fairtrade in Light of Unjust Background Conditions
If we bear the distinction between interactional and institutional understandings 
of responsibilities in mind, we are now well prepared to evaluate Fairtrade 
from a justice-oriented standpoint. We have seen that, although there are good 
reasons for prioritizing an institutional over an interactional understanding 
of responsibilities in the global context, this should not be taken to mean that 
interactional moral principles cannot be plausible in any context, as the case 
of compatible interactional and institutional understandings of human rights 
norms has shown above. Besides that, substantive interactional understandings 
of norms will of course stay of primary importance – especially in representing 
rules for interpersonal behaviour in spatially more restricted contexts. Nor is the 
postulation of the institutional understanding of human rights and corresponding 
responsibilities without its own difficulties, many of which stem from the fact 
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that the conception of institutional responsibilities with global reach elaborated 
so far is still a highly abstract one. For it to be action-guiding in a more concrete 
sense, it needs to be complemented by principles that also take scenarios of non-
compliance into account. While returning to the task of evaluating Fairtrade 
from a normative perspective, it will be useful to think about this set of problems 
in more detail.
Fairtrade Interactionally Understood
In relation to the two understandings of responsibility introduced in the 
preceding section, Fairtrade can first be interpreted as resting on an interactional 
conception of responsibilities. This is because systems of social certification like 
Fairtrade are guided by the goal of restructuring global supply chains, which 
are highly non-transparent under normal world market conditions, in such a 
way as to increase the predictability of the consequences of consumer-producer 
interactions. Fairtrade can therefore be understood as an attempt to provide a 
direct link between producers and consumers that enables consumers to respect 
moral standards within global market interactions by buying certified products. 
More concretely, the interactional conception underlying Fairtrade could be 
described as aiming at justice in market interactions, thereby allowing at least 
three different but not mutually inconsistent interpretations of what just market 
interactions consist of. First, and most fundamentally, just market interactions 
may, in the case of Fairtrade, be understood as those which guarantee the 
fulfilment and non-violation of the producers’ basic human rights. The self-
described aims of the FLO system include securing a minimally acceptable 
standard of living for producers and guaranteeing acceptable working conditions 
within the production process, including the right not to be subjected to forced 
labour, the right to non-discrimination and the right to freedom of association 
in employment. Consumers who purchase Fairtrade products can therefore be 
understood as seeking to contribute to the protection of the producers’ rights to 
a minimally adequate standard of living and the above-mentioned labour rights. 
Beyond that, the aim of realizing just market interactions can secondly be seen 
as accounted for through the avoidance of unneeded intermediaries in the supply 
chain who, under normal circumstances, profit from the spatial remoteness 
of agrarian producers and buy their products at very low prices or grant them 
credits with relatively bad conditions. Fairtrade could thus be understood as 
providing conditions in which no one (neither intermediaries nor distributors 
and consumers in richer countries) profits from unjust and exploitative market 
transactions – in this case from those interactions that include intermediaries 
approaching farmers in remote regions and benefiting from their structural 
disadvantage. The interim payments to agrarian producers in long-term and 
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secure trade partnerships, as foreseen by the FLO system, can be interpreted as a 
further instrument to contribute to the elimination of this second kind of injustice 
in market transactions. 
Third, the minimum prices paid to FLO producers could be understood as being 
just in the more demanding sense that they mirror more adequately the value 
of the respective product. This is especially relevant against the background of 
fluctuating world market prices that are also highly influenced by state measures 
such as agricultural subsidies. In this way minimum prices are not merely one 
of several tools with which the certification system works towards ensuring a 
minimally decent standard of living and minimally acceptable working conditions 
for producers; they could be seen as being just in and of themselves. 
Now, in this interactional reading, Fairtrade does indeed seem vulnerable to 
several points of criticism. From a normative perspective, attempts to realize just 
market exchanges are worthy of critique if they are not also concerned with the 
underlying distribution of goods before the diverse market transactions occur. It 
could be said that attempts to implement just market exchanges do not capture 
all that justice is about – and can therefore only be of secondary importance – 
if they do not also systematically take into account the background justice or 
injustice of the starting positions of such exchanges.31 Moreover, one plausible 
criticism of attempts to realize just market exchanges, which arguably rests on 
a cosmopolitan understanding of institutional responsibilities to protect human 
rights, implies that background justice should not only be demanded for those 
with whom we stand in a relation of economic exchange. In this context it is a 
common objection to Fairtrade that it does not reach many disadvantaged 
farmers because not all of them can afford the licensing costs required for entry 
into the FLO system, or because some of them live in regions so remote that it 
seems structurally impossible to reach them.
Also, the worry formulated in the institutions-centred criticism of Fairtrade, 
namely that the minimum prices could have a counterproductive effect on world 
market prices in the long run if the FLO system were significantly extended, can be 
situated in the context of the criticism of the very idea of just market interactions. 
This warning is directly related to the observation that attempts to realize just 
market interactions between a restricted group of persons can, under some 
circumstances, come at the expense of outsiders. But the criticism of the idea of 
just market exchanges would remain valid even if such distortionary effects on 
world market prices could be avoided by extending the scale of a system of social 
certification like Fairtrade. In other words: even if (as seems to be the case today) 
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the improvements for farmers within the FLO system did not come at the expense 
of farmers in developing countries not participating in Fairtrade,32 attempts to 
realize justice in market transactions would still be vulnerable to the general 
reproach that justice normatively demands more than to satisfy certain moral 
standards within such transactions. A sufficient premise for a critique of practical 
approaches to realizing justice in market exchanges seems to be that those social 
institutions which are shared by the transaction partners can in themselves be 
judged unjust. In this context one can point to the influential Rawlsian paradigm 
that it is the basic structure of society (including a scheme of shared economic 
institutions) which is to be the primary subject of demands of justice, even if 
demands of justice can be indirectly derived from it and thereby also apply to 
singular interactions between agents, like market transactions.33 
With this theoretical background in mind, it is now possible to systematically 
fend off the simple actor-centred negation of responsibilities to respect social 
standards on the part of consumers and entrepreneurs mentioned above. From 
any plausible justice-related standpoint, such a position would only make sense if 
it were already the case that the basic structure of society distributed goods justly 
in such a way as to adequately frame the self-interested behaviour of market 
actors. Typically, however, the extreme form of market liberalism discussed above 
does not seem to have this need for a just distribution of goods through societal 
institutions in mind when criticising the attribution of social responsibility to 
market actors.
Despite the critique coming from the perspective of an institutional 
understanding of justice, the merits of Fairtrade within an interactional reading 
should not be overlooked. As discussed above, we may grant that (1) the criticisms 
concerning the implementation of Fairtrade can generally be defeated and that 
it therefore succeeds in realizing ‘just market exchanges’ in the interpretation 
given here, if only for the time being. We may also grant that (2) under present 
circumstances, Fairtrade is not detrimental to needy farmers outside the 
certification system. And if this is true, then Fairtrade can be seen as providing 
something which is worthy in its own right. It improves the standard of living and 
working conditions of poor producers within the system and enables consumers 
to respect these minimum social standards within market transactions of a global 
scale. Even if market interactions like the ones established through Fairtrade do 
not result in justice in a more comprehensive sense, it is important for consumers 
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to know that in participating in a system of social certification like Fairtrade they 
can contribute to respecting moral standards in a more restricted sense. 
To highlight the sense in which Fairtrade corresponds to an interactional as 
opposed to an institutional understanding of responsibilities, market interactions 
respecting these standards could be called ‘fair’ as opposed to ‘just’. From the 
perspective of consumers wishing to act in a socially responsible way it is only 
important to keep in mind that the participation in Fairtrade cannot amount 
to a comprehensive fulfilment of duties of justice towards poor people around 
the globe, even though this might at times be suggested by systems of social 
certification such as FLO. In the remainder of this article, I will discuss why this is 
not all that can be said about the merits of Fairtrade from a normative perspective. 
Complementing the interpretation of Fairtrade along the lines of an interactional 
conception of global responsibilities, Fairtrade shows at least some compatibility 
with the paramount institutional conception of human rights and justice. 
Fairtrade Institutionally Understood 
A central aspect of the discussion of Fairtrade elaborated so far has been that 
justice demands more of consumers than to only respect moral standards within 
market interactions, and that they do not only bear duties vis-à-vis those with 
whom they undertake economic transactions. In line with the priority of the 
institutional conception of human rights we can postulate a wider human rights-
based duty to human beings encompassing all extremely disadvantaged persons 
worldwide, many of whom are situated outside the world trade system. However, 
the responsibilities implied by the institutional conception of human rights are 
worded so generally that a gap remains between the abstract formulation of 
these responsibilities and the concrete steps required to fulfil them. All that has 
been postulated so far is that the citizens of industrialized nations carry a joint 
responsibility to reform economic and political institutions on the global level so 
that they contribute to the protection and fulfilment of basic human rights on a 
national level. 
It is certainly true that even we as individuals are not lacking in general ideas 
of how to contribute to the institutional protection of human rights through the 
reformation of our global order. For instance, one might think of the necessity 
of a reform of the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF, of a change in the current 
monopoly patent system in the pharmaceutical industry or of the introduction 
of global rules to fight the resource and borrowing privileges of dictators in 
developing countries.34 But besides the need to integrate and spread empirical 
knowledge about such options and making the public familiar with them, the 
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application of more concrete principles seems necessary in order to give better 
indications of the scope and strengths of our duties as individuals and members 
of collectives respectively. 
While this is obviously a broad theoretical challenge that cannot be 
comprehensively dealt with in this article, one important insight is that Fairtrade 
may indeed be seen as corresponding at least to some degree to the abstract 
formulation of global institutional responsibilities. First, it is self-evident that 
to be able to reform our global institutions, a consensual awareness of the need 
for political action to further this aim must be promoted among the citizens 
of the politically influential nations. Besides the aim of improving the living 
conditions of agrarian producers in developing countries, one of the self-declared 
aims of Fairtrade is to broaden the awareness of the need to reform our global 
institutions in order to create world market rules that are more just.35 If Fairtrade 
is indeed able to have such an impact on the minds of consumers, then the results 
of this impact should not be underestimated, and Fairtrade’s growing presence 
in supermarket shelves can hardly be overlooked. Admittedly, an implicit or 
explicit interactional reading of Fairtrade by consumers as being an approach 
to realize fairness in market transactions might also have the contrary effect, 
appeasing consumers that all that justice demands is taking part in such systems 
of social certification. But if Fairtrade can succeed in creating an understanding 
that buying certified products is just the first step in supporting poor farmers 
and producers in developing countries, and that there is a massive need for 
institutional reform besides that, then it seems a sensible project even from the 
perspective of an orthodox institutional conception of global responsibilities. To 
achieve this, Fairtrade may have to add to the information it gives its consumers, 
perhaps through a variation of labelling designs delivering additional knowledge 
about the failures of global institutions, or through more effectively targeted 
public campaigns.
Second, and more importantly, Fairtrade can even be identified more closely with 
the aim of the institutionalization of human rights than has so far been suggested 
by its ‘pure’ interactional reading. Coming back once more to the institutions-
centred criticism of Fairtrade, which postulated the need for the effective 
implementation of social standards in law, it can be countered that – at least in 
theory – minimum social standards in a given society could be comprehensively 
achieved even in the absence of directly corresponding specifications in law.36 
The contrary is also conceivable and can in fact be observed in many developing 
countries, such as those in which a set of basic rights (including social standards at 
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the workplace) are entrenched in the national legislation but nevertheless fail to be 
effectively implemented. Reasons for this may be that some countries simply lack 
the means of securing compliance with these standards and/or that they might, 
under the present circumstances, have an economic interest not to lose their 
status as a low-cost production site.37 It is frequently argued that categorically 
demanding that developing countries implement labour standards would, under 
present conditions, be unfair itself. For instance, proposals to make the reduction 
of trade barriers for developing countries conditional on the implementation of 
labour standards by those countries may – other things being equal – be deemed 
as being another protectionist measure on the part of industrialized nations that 
unfairly hinders economic development in poorer societies. 
In the long run, the lack of compliance with social standards may be 
best addressed through coordinated political efforts to establish effective 
compensation for developing countries to cover the costs of adapting to social 
standards.38 Concerning Fairtrade though, it is revealing to see this system of 
social certification already providing governance mechanisms on a larger scale 
without government engagement securing human rights through law. Local 
development projects like the building of schools, hospitals, bridges and wells, 
among other things, which are financed with the help of the social premiums 
within the FLO system and planned in a participatory way, are a case in point. 
And even if these development projects cannot be seen as amounting to the 
comprehensive fulfilment of human rights in those countries, they can still be said 
to contribute in some degree towards the fulfilment of basic human rights (such 
as the right to education and health care) within smaller communities. Because of 
the possibility of such governance mechanisms being brought about by voluntary 
initiatives like Fairtrade, a theory of global responsibilities to promote justice 
should take into account different degrees of institutionalization of human rights 
and should be able to design different evaluation criteria for them. The fulfilment 
of basic human rights through non-state actors should be systematically weighed 
against other scenarios which foresee a stronger role for state interventions but 
at the same time appear less promising under conditions of a general lack of 
compliance with social standards. 
International businesses may also have responsibilities when legislative 
provisions are lacking. Because of the enormous influence of transnational 
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corporations, which extends in some cases to political decision-making processes 
in developing and emerging economies, they are sometimes confronted with 
expectations of doing even more for the protection of human rights than just 
respecting social standards throughout their supply chains. Since they represent 
a very effective group of collective actors in comparison to the often very weak 
states in which they are economically active, it is at least not implausible to 
demand that they also contribute to the fulfilment of the basic rights of those local 
inhabitants who do not work for them.39 This may be regarded as an ‘unrealistic’ 
demand which overestimates an entrepreneur’s potential willingness to act 
beyond his or her monetary self-interest and at the same time underestimates 
pressures to stay competitive in relation to rival business actors. But whether 
corporate actors will in reality comply with social standards also depends on the 
possibility of improving the public control of corporate behaviour, which under 
normal conditions still appears non-transparent to consumers and the media 
because of the countless parts in the supply chain and the frequent outsourcing 
of production steps. At the same time, whether it is realistic to expect compliance 
with social standards on the part of companies depends also on the degree to 
which this is morally demanded of them by the public. For this reason as well, it 
seems to be important to determine the responsibilities of companies when state 
regulations are lacking to a more concrete extent. But what rationale might be 
drawn on to approach this task?
A first possible step could be to draw on a principle formulated by Derek 
Parfit and further developed by Liam Murphy,40 which was originally meant to 
prescribe the extent to which individuals are obliged to help people in extreme 
poverty if similarly positioned individuals fail to do their bit. Parfit’s principle 
reads as follows: ‘[The principle] does not tell me to give the amount that would 
in fact make the outcome best. It tells me to give the amount which is such that 
if we all gave this amount, the outcome would be best.’41 Now one might ask if 
this principle can also be used to determine the extent of the responsibilities of 
transnational  corporations under a similar situation of non-compliance; that is, 
a situation in which not all the companies involved do their share in respecting 
human rights in the workplace (and maybe even beyond). Such a re-interpretation 
of Parfit’s principle could demand that transnational corporations be obliged to 
respect human rights at least to the degree to which they would have to respect 
them if the institutional basic structure of the particular societies did provide 
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adequate sanctions to all relevant groups of actors to make sure that human rights 
were fulfilled. Since it was suggested above that such a situation is realistically, 
although not necessarily, dependent on the juridification of social standards, 
it seems sensible to empirically devise possibilities of fulfilling such standards 
through legislation and enforcement measures even if political obstacles were to 
prevent their implementation. It would thus seem possible to formulate more 
concretely the minimum extent of a company’s obligations even under conditions 
which lack such juridification. That the voluntary compliance with social 
standards along these lines is in conflict with the goal of maximizing profits may 
be true at least as long as the public does not force transnational corporations 
to comply with social standards through media campaigns and, if possible, 
through targeted consumer behaviour.42 In the long run, it could therefore lie 
in the well-understood interest of corporations to contribute on a political level 
to the juridification of social standards, since this seems to be the only reliable 
way of establishing fair competition with other corporations. It should not come 
as a surprise that such a process leading to the fulfilment of human rights could, 
therefore, also rest on a motive such as the pursuit of corporate self-interest. 
Turning again to the responsibilities of consumers under conditions of 
background injustice, several lines of thought developed in this article can be 
brought together. In particular, it may be asked whether consumers have a duty 
to favour socially certified over non-certified products or whether there is still 
some degree of moral choice. Along the lines of the account put forward in this 
paper, a consumer’s responsibility should generally be conceived of as being 
wider than just extending to the interactional relation with the producers of 
purchased products. It can therefore be concluded that this may legitimately 
lead to situations in which consumers can weigh the option of buying a certified 
product and thereby contributing to the well-being of its producers against the 
option of advancing background justice in another way, for instance by giving 
money to a non-governmental organization and/or by promoting institutional 
reform more directly on a political level. 
The assumption that consumers are categorically obliged to buy socially 
certified products seems too strong, just as the assumption that they already 
fulfil all their duties of justice by buying such products seems too weak. Yet the 
same assessment can also be stated far more constructively, since consumers 
can naturally be moved to do both: to respect moral standards within market 
interactions via participation in systems of social certification (which was seen 
as carrying some value in itself, even if not topping institutional responsibilities) 
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and to work individually and jointly towards the goal of an institutionally just 
world. In any case, the basic compatibility of Fairtrade with the duty to advance 
the justice of societal institutions also means that the act of buying a Fairtrade 
product can already be reasonably understood as responding to some degree to 
the wider notion of responsibility of advancing justice in an unjust world. 
Conclusion
The reflections on Fairtrade in this paper have brought about several results. 
Coming back to the central conceptual distinction of this paper, it was shown 
how Fairtrade can, contrary to first appearances, be understood as a practice 
enabling the fulfilment not only of interactional responsibilities to respect 
standards of fairness towards producers in developing countries, but also – to a 
lesser degree – of institutional responsibilities to promote justice globally. Even 
if institutional responsibilities seem to carry more weight in the global context 
and are accomplishable in many other ways, Fairtrade’s possible contribution to 
raise public awareness, and more importantly its governance mechanism (put in 
place through the fulfilment of basic human rights in small communities), may 
be taken as indicators that Fairtrade is a transformative practice in a global age 
characterized by vast background injustices. Certification systems like that of 
FLO have the potential to change the view consumers might take towards the 
issue of corporate responsibility. In this context it was more generally argued 
that corporations may be regarded as having predominant obligations to respect 
human rights within global supply chains, while conceding that the thoughts 
elaborated on here could be amplified through a more comprehensive account of 
corporate responsibilities under unjust circumstances.
Regarding Fairtrade’s admittedly greater affinity to an interactional 
understanding of responsibilities, it was argued that interactional and institutional 
conceptions of responsibility, at least in principle, do not conflict with each other. 
That is, taking certain empirical conditions like the avoidance of harm to other 
non-participating agents for granted, these two forms of responsibility can be 
fulfilled in a complementary way. While this may cease to be true at some point in 
the future, it nevertheless seems to hold under the current circumstances. 
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